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In 1981 President Ronald Reagan issued Executive Order No.
12,3241 (the "Executive Order") and Proclamation No. 48652 (the
"Proclamation") which generally addressed the problem of illegal
immigration into the United States and the interdiction of illegal
1. Exec. Order No. 12,324, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,109 (1981).
2. Proclamation No. 4865, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,107 (1981) [hereinafter Proclamation].
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aliens on the high seas. The Executive Order authorized the Secre-
tary of State to enter into cooperative arrangements with appropri-
ate foreign governments for the purpose of preventing illegal immi-
gration into the United States by sea.3 In the only exercise of
authority under the Order, the United States and Haiti4 entered
into a treaty providing that the two governments would interdict
and return Haitian migrants and vessels involved in illegal trans-
port of persons to Haiti.' Under the treaty, the Government of the
Republic of Haiti consented to the interdiction of Haitian flag ves-
sels on the high seas by the United States Coast Guard in order to
aid in the enforcement of the immigration laws of the United
States.' Under the agreement, any vessel violating United States
immigration laws may be returned to the Republic of Haiti or re-
leased to representatives of its government.'
On January 7, 1988, the United States Coast Guard cutter
Dauntless was patrolling the Windward passage between Cuba and
Haiti, an area approximately 500 miles southeast of Miami.8 Dur-
ing its patrol, the Dauntless sighted and approached the Dieu
Kyvle, a wooden sailboat with eighty-nine Haitian refugees
crowded on its deck." Acting under the authority of the interdic-
3. Exec. Order No. 12,324, supra note 1, § 1. President Reagan, alarmed by the influx of
illegal migrants into the United States by sea, expressly authorized the Coast Guard "[tio
stop and board . . .vessels, when there is reason to believe that such vessels are engaged in
the irregular transportation of persons or violations of United States law or the law of a
country with which the United States has an arrangement authorizing such action." Id. §
2(c)(1). The Coast Guard was also instructed "[t]o return the vessel and its passengers to
the country from which it came, when there is reason to believe that an offense is being
committed against the United States immigration laws . . . provided, however, that no per-
son who is a refugee will be returned without his consent." Id. § 2(c)(3).
4. Agreement Relating to Establishment of a Cooperative Program of Interdiction and
Selective Return of Certian Haitian Migrants and Vessels Involved in Illegal Transport of
Persons Coming from Haiti, Sept. 23, 1981, United States-Haiti, 33 U.S.T. 3559, T.I.A.S.
No. 10241. The agreement was signed at Port-au-Prince, Haiti on September 23, 1981 and
entered into force that same day. The treaty expressed "the mutual desire of ... [the] two
governments to cooperate to stop . . . illegal migration" of Haitians into the United States.
Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. Conversely, Haitian authorities are authorized to interdict "a U.S. flag vessel,
outbound from Haiti, . . . [if] engaged in such illegal trafficking. ... Whenever the Coast
Guard detains a Haitian vessel, they must notify promptly the appropriate Haitian
authorities.
7. Id.
8. Gerabino, Haitian Gives Birth to U.S. Baby, Miami Herald, Jan. 11, 1988, at Al, col.
5.
9. Id. See also Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified at
8 U.S.C. §§ 1522-1525 (1988)) (amending Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§
1101-1251 (1988)). The Immmigration and Nationality Act defines refugee as: "Any person
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tion treaty, the Coast Guard intercepted the Dieu Kyvle and trans-
ferred all the refugees to the Dauntless." Hours after the intercep-
tion of the sailboat, the number of refugees aboard the Dauntless
increased from eighty-nine to ninety when Sate Teresias gave birth
to a baby girl." The crew of the Dauntless welcomed the baby,
Wislene, into the world as a United States citizen. 2 Shortly after
the birth, Wislene and her mother were airlifted to Georgetown,
Bahamas and then to Opa Locka, Florida for medical examinations
and treatment.'" The other eighty-eight refugees from the Dieu
Kyvle were immediately returned to Haiti.'
Caught off guard by the unexpected turn of events, the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service (INS or the "Service") and the
Department of State vacillated in determining the citizenship sta-
tus of the one day old Wislene. Their confusion arose from the
question of whether or not a United States public vessel should be
considered a "floating piece" of United States territory. This di-
lemma needed to be resolved as a prerequisite to any final, binding
decision by the INS regarding Wislene's citizenship. On the one
hand, if the INS ruled that a United States Coast Guard cutter
was in fact United States "territory," the fourteenth amendment
requirement" that one must be born "in the United States" in or-
der to qualify for citizenship would be met. Wislene would then
become a bona fide citizen of the United States. On the other
hand, in the event that the cutter was deemed not to be United
States "territory," Wislene would not qualify for United States cit-
izenship.' 6 The INS, in a short two-page memorandum, declared
who is outside any country of such person's nationality and who is unable or unwilling
to return to .. . that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion. ... Id. at 1l10(42)(A).
10. Gerabino, supra note 8, at A4, col. 1.
11. Id. The Coast Guard corpsmen delivered Ms. Teresias' baby. This was the first inci-
dent of a birth aboard a Coast Guard cutter during an interdiction action.
12. Miami Herald, Jan. 12, 1988, at Al, col 2. Perry Rivkind, District Director of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in Miami called this event "a precedent
case." Id. At the time, there was considerable debate about whether Wislene was a United
States citizen or not.
13. Gerabino, supra note 8, at Al, col. 2. Once a refugee has entered the United States,
he or she is entitled, at a minimum, to a deportation hearing before the INS. 8 U.S.C. § 1252
(1988).
14. Gerabino, supra note 8, at Al, col. 2.
15. Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment provides: "All persons born or naturalized
in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
16. If the INS decided that Wislene was not a United States citizen, she would acquire
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Wislene Teresias ineligible for United States citizenship. 7
II. SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE
This comment will focus on the issues relevant to the question
of whether a United States public vessel is United States "terri-
tory," and, therefore qualifies any person born upon such vessel for
United States citizenship or whether a United States public vessel
is United States territory only in a metaphorical sense. Further,
this comment will contrast and compare merchant vessels with
public vessels, demonstrating why it is imperative that public ves-
sels be recognized as "territory" of the state of registry. In addi-
tion, this comment will examine the phenomenon of fluctuating
territorial status, where a merchant ship within a state's territorial
water is regarded as territory of the coastal state, yet, upon cross-
ing over into the high seas, no longer possesses that characteris-
tic.'5 Finally, this comment will discuss policy concerns which prin-
cipally impact the INS decision on the Dauntless incident.
III. UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP IN GENERAL
United States citizenship is governed by both the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution and the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act of 1952.'9 An individual may gain United
States citizenship in five principal ways: 1) birth in the United
States; 0 2) birth outside the United States, but to parents who are
Haitian nationality under the rule of jus sanguinis. The principle of jus sanguinis provides
that a child's citizenship is determined by the citizenship of the parents. BLACK's LAW Dic-
TIONARY 775 (5th ed. 1979). As Ms. Teresias was a citizen of Haiti, Wislene would also be-
come R Haitian citizen.
17. See Memorandum from Perry A. Rivkind to Jack Penca (Jan. 12, 1988)(unpub-
lished memorandum available in the offices of Inter-American Law Review, University of
Miami School of Law) [hereinafter INS Memorandum]. For a reprint of the INS Memoran-
dum, see in/ra app.
Following the INS decision, Sate Teresias requested political asylum.
18. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter Law of the Sea
Treaty]. Article 86 of this treaty defines the high seas as "all parts of the sea that are not
included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a
State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State." Id. art. 86.
19. Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-
1503 (1988)).
20. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a), (b). This citizenship requirement includes children born to Indi-
ans, Eskimos, Aluets or any other aboriginal tribe.
[Vol. 21:1
THE DAUNTLESS INCIDENT
both citizens of the United States;2 3) birth outside the United
States and its outlying possessions to parents, one of whom is a
United States citizen "who has been physically present in the
United States or one of its outlying possessions for a continuous
period of one year prior to the birth and the other of whom is
a national of the United States"; 2 4) if a person of unknown
parentage and under five years of age is found in the United
States;" and 5) birth outside the "geographical limits of the
United States ...of parents one of whom is an alien, and the
other a citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth .. was
physically present in the United States . for a period total-
ing not less than five years, at least two of which were after attain-
ing the age of fourteen years . "..."24
The Romans originally used the word citizen to denote an in-
dividual who had the freedom to wander through Rome and the
right to exercise all political and civil privileges that the govern-
ment had to offer.' 5 Citizenship was often perceived as a "legal
bond" between a person and his home state, encompassing certain
rights and duties.28 From the inception of citizenship, states held
the power to establish their own requirements for citizenship as
well as restraints on citizenship. 7
21. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c). One of the parents must have a "residence in the United States
or one of its outlying possessions." Id.
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(d).
23. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(f). If it is shown, however, before the child reaches the age of
twenty-one, that he was not born in the United States, then the child is not a United States
citizen.
24. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g).
25. See Thomasson v. State, 15 Ind. 449, 451 (1860). Aristotle viewed a citizen as "one
who is fit to both govern and obey, fit both to make the laws and to observe them." Igna-
tieff, The Myth of Citizenship, 12 QUEEN'S LA. 399, 401-02 (1987).
26. See Wiessner, Blessed Be the Ties that Bind: The Nexus Between Nationality and
Territory, 56 Miss. LJ. 447, 449 (1986). The legal bond theory is one of relationship and is
well-known in the United States. Citing Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Sugarman v. Dougall,
413 U.S. 634, 652 (1972), Wiessner illustrates this theory: "In constitutionally defining who
is a citizen of the United States, Congress obviously thought it was doing something, and
something important. Citizenship meant something, a status in and relationship with a soci-
ety which is continuing and more basic than mere presence or residence." Wiessner, supra,
at 449, n.7.
27. See Nishimura Eiku v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892). "It is an accepted maxim
of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, inherent in sovereignty, and
essential to self preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to
admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe." Id.
at 659. The United States Constitution, as originally adopted, gave Congress the right to
regulate naturalization, and therefore, the right to make laws concerning citizenship. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
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Prior to 1866, there was no constitutional or statutory provi-
sion defining United States citizenship. It was generally held,
under the common law principle of jus soli, 5 that a person born in
the United States acquired citizenship at birth.2 9 Congress for-
mally adopted this principle in the Civil Rights Act of 18660 and
incorporated it two years later into the fourteenth amendment. Al-
though the fourteenth amendment was adopted with the specific
intent to confer citizenship on individuals of African descent, it
nonetheless provided, for the first time, a constitutional basis for
citizenship.3' Consequently, under the fourteenth amendment, a
citizen of the United States is any person, regardless of race or
color, born within the territorial limits of the United States or nat-
uralized in accordance with United States laws.3"
At present, the current nationality law of the United States is
the Immigration and Nationality Act (the "Act"). 33 Section 1401 of
the Act embraces the language of the fourteenth amendment, stat-
ing in part: "The following shall be nationals and citizens of the
United States at birth: (a) a person born in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof. . . ." All persons born in the
United States, therefore, become United States citizens. 4 In con-
trast, persons born in outlying possessions are nationals of the
United States.3 5
The relevant citizenship language of the Act and the four-
teenth amendment are essentially indistinguishable. An examina-
tion of the fourteenth amendment and the Act demonstrates that
citizenship can only be achieved by fulfilling two indispensable re-
28. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 775 (5th ed. 1979).
29. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (despite alien parentage, a
child born on land over which the United States exercised dominion as a sovereign power, is
a citizen).
30. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27.
31. See Burgess, Being and Becoming an American: Citizenship in the USA, 16 COLO.
LAW. 1563, 1564 (1987).
32. See generally Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649; Prowd v. Gore, 57 Cal. App. 458, 207 P.
490 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1922).
33. See supra note 19.
34. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1403, 1406 & 1407. See also Burgess, supra note 31, at 1567. The United
States is defined as the continental mainland, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and
Guam. In addition, the "ports, harbors, bays, enclosed sea areas, and a three-mile marginal
belt, along the coasts thereof, form a part of the territorial limits of the United States." 5
Fed. Immigration L. Rep. (WSB) 16,520; INS Operations Instructions Interpretations §
301.1(a)(2).
35. 8 U.S.C. § 1408. See also Burgess, supra note 31, at 1567. All other individuals are
classified as either non-immigrant or immigrant aliens. Id. at 1566.
[Vol. 21:1
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quirements, one jurisdictional and the other physical. A citizen,
therefore, is one born on soil that is part of the contiguous United
States and exclusively under the authority of the United States
government.
To fully grasp this concept, the following illustration is useful.
Ms. X, a United States citizen, gives birth in a local hospital in a
small town in Pennsylvania. First, the child's birth physically oc-
curred in the United States. Second, the child is subject to all laws,
ordinances, and legislation of both the State of Pennsylvania and
the United States. Accordingly, the birth satisfied both citizenship
requirements and, consequently, the child is a United States citi-
zen. This illustration provides a simple and uncomplicated applica-
tion of the fourteenth amendment and the Act's citizenship re-
quirements. However, this concept becomes more difficult to grasp
when foreign territory is involved.
Children born in the United States to a parent accredited to
the United States as a foreign diplomat do not acquire United
States citizenship." The child, instead, acquires the citizenship of
the parent as if he or she had been born in the country of which
his or her parent is a representative.37 Members of a diplomat's
immediate family enjoy the same privileges and immunities as
those proffered to the diplomat himself. 8 As the diplomat owes his
allegiance to his sovereign, so too does the diplomat's child even
though born in the receiving state. Therefore, despite a birth in the
United States and a technical qualification for United States citi-
zenship," the child will not become a United States citizen.
36. Generally, a state sends an emissary to a receiving state in a gesture of friendship
and conciliation. When a representative departs the sending state, he travels as if under a
special protective shield, a shield of governmental immunity. Therefore, even when settled
in a receiving state, the envoy is wrapped in a cloak of sheltering immunity. The diplomat is
subject only to the laws of the sending state. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,
Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter Vienna Con-
vention]. For example, a diplomatic agent is immune from criminal jurisdiction of the re-
ceiving state. Id. art. 32(1),(2).
37. 3 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 373, at 282 (1906). Foreign diplo-
mats are those individuals listed in the Department of State Blue List and include ambassa-
dors, ministers, and charges d'affaires.
38. Vienna Convention, supra note 36, art. 37(1). "The members of the family of a
diplomatic agent forming part of his household shall, if they are not nationals of the receiv-
ing State, enjoy the privileges and immunities specified in Articles 29 to 36." Id. Members of
the administrative and technical staff of the mission receive the same protection as the dip-
lomat but the protection does not extend to "acts performed outside the course of their
duties." Id. art. 37(2).
39. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a).
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Wislene Teresias' birth aboard a United States Coast Guard
cutter on the high seas certainly does not lend itself to a simple
application of the fourteenth amendment and the Act's citizenship
standards. However, the INS, in an attempt to resolve the matter
promptly and painlessly, processed Wislene's case in a routine and
unimaginative manner. Further, the INS result set forth an alarm-
ing precedent in terms of United States dominion over its public
vessels.
IV. THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE DECISION
The first segment of the INS opinion carefully traces the lim-
ited case law pertaining to the legal status of vessels registered in
the United States.4 It is important to note that there are few court
decisions that specifically address this type of issue." The seminal
case, which was the first case that the INS examined, was Cunard
S.S. Co. v. Mellon.42 The Cunard case involved a number of pri-
vate steamship companies operating passenger ships between the
United States and foreign ports.' 3 The companies, ten of which
were foreign corporations4 and two of which were of United States
registry,4 5 were seeking to enjoin the Secretary of the Treasury
from enforcing the National Prohibition Act against them.'" Be-
cause the Court felt that the Act was so closely related to the
eighteenth amendment, it first examined the phrase-"the United
States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof..'..
40. See INS Memorandum, supra note 17.
41. Id.
42. 262 U.S. 100 (1923).
43. Id. at 119.
44. Id. at 100.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 119. The Department of the Treasury was attempting to require that all
ships, whether of foreign or United States registry, seal their liquor stores upon entering
United States territorial waters. Id. at 119-20. However, the Attorney General, interpreting
the National Prohibition Act in conjunction with the eighteenth amendment, declared it
unlawful for any ship, whether foreign or domestic, to bring alcoholic beverages into United
States territorial waters. In addition, he opined that domestic ships could not carry liquor at
any time, even when on the high seas. Id. at 120.
47. Id. at 121. Several interpretations of the word "territory" were proposed and argued
by both appellant ship companies and appellee, the Secretary of the Treasury. The plain-
tiffs, in general, argued that a United States flag ship was not "territory subject to the juris-
diction of the United States" when on the high seas or in foreign ports. Id. at 117. The
reasoning behind this argument centered around the belief that the eighteenth amendment
did not give Congress the "power to legislate for lands subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States . . .or for vessels of the United States engaged in foreign or coastwise com-
[Vol. 21:1
THE DAUNTLESS INCIDENT
The Court defined the term "territory" as "the regional areas-of
land and adjacent waters-over which the United States claims
and exercises dominion and control as a sovereign power." '
Despite the fact that the Cunard Court examined the language
of the eighteenth amendment in the context of private merchant
vessels, the INS wholeheartedly embraced the Court's definition of
"territory." Because the eighteenth and the fourteenth amend-
ments employ identical language, the Service posited that the
Cunard clarification was apropos for the Dauntless predicament.
Therefore, the INS decision balanced precariously on a 1923 deci-
sion that interpreted language of a since-repealed amendment.49
In addition, the Cunard decision was entirely fact specific.
Any interpretation other than the one set forth in Cunard, under
the circumstances, would have ravaged commonly accepted inter-
national edicts of sovereignty. The Court was not amenable to the
idea of relinquishing customary jurisdiction over foreign merchant
vessels while in United States coastal waters.5 0 This was too great a
leap to make. However, in the Dauntless case, the INS deliberately
opened that door to future predicaments involving United States
public vessels when sailing in foreign seas by declaring that a
United States public vessel was not the territory of the United
States.
The INS then examined case law that specifically contem-
plated the issue of births on United States private vessels. The
INS scrutinized two pre-1950 cases, both of which held that a
child born of an alien parent aboard a United States registered
merchant vessel did not qualify for United States citizenship.
The first case, Lam Mow v. Nagle,"' involved the birth of a
child to Chinese parents, both domiciliaries of the United States,
aboard a United States merchant vessel on the high seas.2 The
question before the court was whether the child was a citizen of
merce." Id. The appellee, however, agreed with the District Judge that vessels, no matter
where they were located, were "territory subject to the jurisdiction of the United States...
and subject to the penalties of the National Prohibition Act .. " Id.
48. Id. at 122. The Court interpreted the term, as used in the eighteenth amendment,
in a physical rather than a metaphorical sense. "[ilt refers to areas ... having fixity of
location and recognized boundaries." Id.
49. The eigthteenth amendment was repealed by section 1 of the twenty-first amend-
ment, which was ratified on December 5, 1933. See US. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1.
50. Cunard, 262 U.S. at 124-25.
51. 24 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1928).
52. Id. at 317.
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the United States.5 3 The Fourth Circuit, relying on the definition
of territory adopted in Cunard, declared that a child must be born
in a location where the sovereign is in total possession and power
so that at his birth, he owes complete obedience to the sovereign.5'
As the vessel was used exclusively for commercial endeavors and
was not under the sole jurisdiction of the United States, the child
was found not to be a United States citizen."
The second case, In the Matter of A-,56 addressed a similar
question. Here, a child was born of lawful permanent United
States residents aboard a United States merchant vessel some 400
miles from the United States coast.57 Embracing the reasoning of
the Cunard and the Lam Mow decisions, the Central Office of the
INS declared that the child was not a United States citizen. 8
Despite the fact that the case law the INS relied on involved
private merchant vessels, the INS proclaimed that the result did
not change merely because a child was born on a public vessel. " At
this point, the logic of the INS decision disintegrates. The applica-
tion of the controlling case law from private to public vessels rests
solely on a statement from the Department of State's Foreign Af-
fairs Manual ° and the unofficial agency positions of the Navy and
Coast Guard."' The INS ruled that the Dauntless was not part of
United States territory and, therefore, Wislene's birth aboard a
United States public vessel failed to qualify her for United States
citizenship. 2
53. Id.
54. Id. at 318. The court explained that there are some exceptions to this rule. To take
one example, a child born to an ambassador would be considered a subject of the sovereign
whom the ambassador represents. Id.
55. Id.
56. 3 1. & N. Dec. 677 (CO 1949).
57. Id. The child's parents were of Portuguese descent yet were lawful permanent resi-
dents of the United States. They were returning to the United States at the time of the
child's birth.
58. Id. at 679.
59. See INS Memorandum, supra note 17; Helgesen v. United States, 275 F. Supp. 789
(S.D.N.Y. 1966)(defining a Coast Guard vessel as a public vessel).
60. DEP'T OF STATE, 7 FOREIGN AFF. MANUAL 1113.1-4(a).
61. Both the Navy and Coast Guard, according to the INS Memorandum, supra note
17, do not consider their vessels to be United States territory.
62. See INS Memorandum, infra app. Obviously, in light of the foregoing authorities, if
the Dauntless had been within the three mile territorial limit at the time of Wislene's birth,
she would have automatically qualified for United States citizenship. See RESTATEMENT (RE-
VISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 511 (1986) [hereinafter RESTATE-
MENT] (the territorial sea is "a belt of sea that may not exceed 12 nautical miles, measured
from a baseline which is either the low-water line along the coast, or the seaward limit of the
[Vol. 21:1
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V. AN EXAMINATION OF UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP
REQUIREMENTS
A. The Physical Requirement
Both the fourteenth amendment and the Act require that for
an individual to attain United States citizenship at birth, she must
be born on United States territory." However, the concept of what
is United States territory is not always easily discernable.
The INS wholeheartedly adopted the Court's interpretation in
Cunard of the phrase "in the United States." According to this
definition, an individual born on actual United States soil qualifies
for United States citizenship."' However, an individual could also
acquire United States citizenship if born aboard a ship sailing in
United States territorial waters.6 5 It is irrelevant whether the ship
is of foreign or domestic registry, so long as it is located in the
territorial waters at the time of the birth.66 These are the only two
available avenues towards citizenship according to the INS.
The notion that a child born aboard a foreign registered vessel
located in United States coastal waters can acquire United States
citizenship seems somewhat confusing at first. However, this pre-
liminary confusion results from the voluntary submission of a
merchant vessel, upon entering the coastal waters of the United
States, to exclusive U.S. jurisdiction. 7 In contrast, public vessels
upon entering the coastal waters of a foreign state, do not submit
themselves to the exclusive jurisdiction of that state. Instead, the
doctrine of sovereign immunity controls.6 "
internal waters of the coastal state..."). The United States has adopted a 12 mile belt as
the territorial sea limit. The Presidential Proclamation Extending Territorial Sea of the
United States to Twelve Miles, 24 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1661 (Dec. 27, 1988).
63. Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment and 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) both require that
birth be physically located within United States territory to qualify for automatic citizen-
ship. However, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c)-(e), (g) provide for "contructive physical locatliy at birth
to qualify for United States citizenship."
64. See INS Memorandum, infra app.
65. Id.
66. G. HACKWORTH, supra note 37, at 10.
67. See INS Memorandum, infra app.
68. The doctrine of sovereign immunity recognizes that where one sovereign exercises
jurisdiction over certain property, a different sovereign cannot exercise concurrent jurisdic-
tion. See L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND
MATERIALS 33-34 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter HENKIN & PUGH]. The doctrine developed at a
time when sea travel first became commonplace, reflecting the need for maintaining order
both on the high seas and in territorial waters. Normally, foreign sovereigns would not vol-
1989]
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In 1952, the Department of State clarified its stand on sover-
eign immunity.69 Immunity was recommended only when public
acts of a foreign sovereign were involved.70 Commercial activity
carried on by private parties was excluded completely from immu-
nity.7 ' However, in 1976, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
was adopted, 72 which formally recognized that foreign public ves-
sels were worthy of deference while in the coastal waters of another
state and refused to show deference to foreign merchant vessels."s
Examining an analogous situation can best explain this princi-
ple. The Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations74 provides
that embassy premises are inviolable by the host state. 75 The prop-
erty is recognized as territory of the foreign state and the receiving
state is under a duty to protect the embassy from any intrusion or
disturbance of the peace. 7' Diplomatic immunity allows the diplo-
mat to carry on his official business free from outside pressures or
coercion." Therefore, even though the embassy is physically lo-
cated in the host state, it is perceived as territory of the sending
state.
Under this logic, Wislene's birth aboard the Dauntless in in-
ternational waters, fulfills the physical requirement for United
States citizenship. The cutter, a public vessel under the complete
control of a commanding officer employed by the United States
government, was entitled to all of the privileges and immunities
allowed under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.78 Because
the vessel qualifies for this type of immunity, it is free from the
exercise of jurisdiction by any foreign sovereign even if found in
untarily subject themselves to the jurisdiction of a host without an implied understanding
that an absolute grant of immunity from the territorial sovereign's power accompanied the
ship's entry into the host's territory. See Schooner-Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. 116
(1812).
69. The Tate Letter, 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976), reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 1388 (1976). The Act was
adopted, in part, to eliminate the discretionary element of determining what did or did not
qualify for sovereign immunity.
73. Id. § 1611(b).
74. Vienna Convention, supra note 36.
75. Id. art. 22(1). Embassies are entitled to this status primarily due to foreign policy
considerations.
76. Id. art. 22(2).
77. Id. preamble.
78. See supra note 72.
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the territorial waters of a foreign state.7e Under the Act, the
Dauntless essentially carved out an island of United States sover-
eignty from an area that is otherwise recognized as territory of the
coastal state.8 0 Thus the cutter and all persons aboard were subject
to the sole jurisdiction of the United States.
B. The Jurisdictional Requirement
International law has long recognized that a state has jurisdic-
tion over all vessels flying its flag."1 A state also has absolute power
to prescribe, adjudicate, and enforce rules of law for conduct occur-
ring within its own territory.8 2 Whether or not a state may exercise
jurisdiction, under international law, depends on two factors: "i)
. . . the interest that state . . . may reasonably have in exercising
the particular jurisdiction asserted . . .; [and] ii) . . . the need to
reconcile that interest with the interest of other states in exercising
jurisdiction. ,83
The general rule is that an individual who commits a crime
aboard a United States flag ship, public or private, is subject to
prosecution in the United States"4 and the matter would be adjudi-
cated in the United States courts under applicable United States
laws. 5 Under these circumstances, the vessel is considered to be
"territory" of the United States."8 However, when two different
states assert concurrent jurisdiction, it is necessary to determine
79. 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(2).
80. G. HACKWORTH, supra note 37, at 11.
81. Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 30-31 (Sept.
7). This was a case of concurrent jurisdiction. It involved a collision on the high seas of a
Turkish steamer and a French steamer. Eight Turkish sailors and passengers were killed as
a result of the collision. The French steamer, the Lotus, arrived in Constantinople and crim-
inal proceedings were instituted against the captain of the Turkish steamer and the officer
of the watch on board the Lotus. Id. at 5. The French Government presented its arguments
to the court in decree-like form. They argued that "acts performed on the high seas on
board a merchant ship are, in principle and from the point of view of criminal proceedings,
amenable only to the jurisdiction of the courts of the State whose flag the vessel flies .. "
Id. at 7. The Turkish Government relied on the argument that "[vlessels on the high seas
form part of the territory of the nation whose flag they fly, and . . . the place where the
offence was committed being [a vessel] . . . flying the Turkish flag, Turkey's jurisdiction is
as clear as if the case had occurred on her territory .. " Id. at 9.
82. Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829, 839 (Perm. Ct.
Arb. 1928).
83. HENKIN & PUGH, supra note 68, at 823.
84. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1, 7 (1988).
85. Id. § 7.
86. Case of the S.S. Lotus, supra note 81, at 25.
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which state has a greater connection to the participants and the
location where the incident occurred. 7
An example of the later proposition is when a passenger
murders a fellow passenger aboard a United States flag ship. Both
passengers are United States citizens and the vessel is docked in a
foreign port at the time of the crime. The United States in such a
situation would maintain that it has jurisdiction over the matter
because the vessel is registered in the United States and because
the victim and alleged murderer were United States citizens. The
foreign state could claim jurisdiction based on the occurrence of
the crime in its soveriegn jurisdiction.
In the end, territorial considerations do not control in concur-
rent jurisdiction problems. They are resolved on a case by case ba-
sis and in accordance with principles of comity. A court would ex-
amine the various relationships and determine which state had a
greater interest in the resolution of the matter.
In addition, a state has the power to exercise jurisdiction over
conduct that occurs outside its territory but which that state feels
the repercussions within.8 In this context, a criminal act commit-
ted aboard a United States flag ship on the high seas would be
regarded as having been committed on United States territory and
the United States would have exclusive jurisdiction over the mat-
ter.
As discussed previously, a foreign public vessel is considered
territory of the foreign sovereign even when found in territorial
waters of another state.89 Therefore, any crime committed aboard a
United States Coast Guard cutter would be subject to adjudication
under United States law and in a United States court. Because the
ship is visualized as territory, the right to exercise jurisdiction is
the same as if the crime had been committed in Miami, Florida.
Sate Teresias was subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States the moment she set foot aboard the Dauntless. If she had
murdered anyone on the cutter, her case would have been adjudi-
cated in the United States. Sate Teresias was not immune from the
87. See, e.g., United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933).
88. Case of the S.S. Lotus, supra note 81, at 29. This doctrine is the protective princi-
ple of jurisdiction. When a state has an interest in protecting itself against acts that
threaten its existence or proper functioning as a state, even though those acts are not exe-
cuted within its territory or by a national of their state, the state can exercise jurisdiction
over the event.
89. See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
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criminal, civil or administrative jurisdiction of the United States.90
Precisely because the mother was subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States at the time she gave birth, it naturally follows that
the child was subject to its jurisdiction as well. Thus, Wislene Ter-
esias fulfilled the second prong of the fourteenth amendment citi-
zenship "test."91
VI. MERCHANT VESSEL VERSUS PUBLIC VESSEL
Courts that have examined the issue of whether a birth aboard
a ship found on the high seas qualifies the child for United States
citizenship under the fourteenth amendment have done so under
exceptionally narrow factual circumstances. Both the Lam Mow
and the In the Matter of A- births occurred aboard merchant
vessels. 2 Merchant vessels and public vessels are, however, dispa-
rate in nature. While they are flag ships of a particular state, a
merchant vessel is perceived as one that is merely registered by the
state, with no special connection to the state other than an admin-
istrative one.9 A public vessel, however, has a special relationship
with its registering state such that there is no mistaking its alle-
giance towards nor agency with its sovereign.
The basic facts of both Lam Mow and In the Matter of A-
cases are similar to those of the case of Wislene Teresias. All three
involved a birth aboard a United States flag ship on the high seas.
In all three cases, the child was born to a parent who was not a
citizen of the United States. The one distinguishing factor, the one
that makes all the difference for Wislene, is that she was born
aboard a Coast Guard cutter and not a passenger ship.
A public vessel is "one [that is] owned absolutely by the
United States" and "whose officers are civil service employees
. .9, A Coast Guard cutter has specifically been recognized as a
90. As she would be if she were a diplomat and covered by the Vienna Convention,
supra note 36, art. 31(1).
91. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("... and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.
92. In the Matter of A-, 3 I. & N. Dec. 677 (CO 1949); Lam Mow v. Nagle, 24 F.2d 316
(9th Cir. 1928).
93. Lam Mow, 24 F.2d at 317. While it is true that the merchant vessels owes allegiance
to no other country but the one in which it is registered, that does not hold any particular
significance.
94. Helgesen v. United States, 275 F. Supp. 789, 790, n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The United
States owns absolutely the public vessel. If the vessel were sold, the proceeds would be put
into the United States Treasury. See 10 U.S.C. § 2575 (1988). Ownership is an important
consideration in determining whether a vessel is territory of the state of registry, but there
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public vessel. 5 A warship is also an example of a public vessel."
On the high seas, "[w]arships represent the sovereignty and inde-
pendence of their State more fully than anything else can re-
present it on the ocean. . . ."I" A Coast Guard cutter is the
equivalent of a warship and enjoys the same immunities. 8
The distinction between a merchant vessel and a public vessel
is an important one for our discussion. While a merchant vessel
might be registered and licensed by the United States, the United
States has no real control over the ship nor does it retain any as-
pect of ownership of the vessel.9 Owners of merchant ships usually
have little or no connection with the country of registry and many
nations permit ship registry with few prerequisites except the pay-
ment of a fee.100 If a merchant ship enters the territorial waters of
a foreign state in a capacity other than innocent passage, 0 1 the
is more to ownership than considerations of jurisdiction and control. The Naval Station at
Guantanomo Bay, Cuba serves as a useful illustration of this concept. The United States
exercises jurisdiction and control over this Naval Station. The Department of State officially
declared that this territory "has never been incorporated into or become a party of the
United States and that, accordingly, that portion of Article 14 of the Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States which related to the acquisition of American citizenship
through birth in the United States does not apply .. " The Assistant Secretary of State to
the Secretary of the Navy, Mar. 26, 1932, Dep't of State File No. 131/5594 (citing Downes v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 251 (1901)). Despite this statement, a United States public ship can
be distinguished from the Naval Station at Guantanomo Bay. The outer section and a part
of the shore line of the bay, used as the naval base, is leased by the United States under
treaties signed by both Cuba and the United States. Agreement for the Lease to the United
States of Lands in Cuba for Coaling and Naval Stations, Feb. 23, 1903, United States-Cuba,
T.S. No. 418 (continued in effect by the Treaty of May 29, 1934, T.S. No. 866).
95. Helgesen, 275 F. Supp. at 795.
96. Id. at 790, n.3. A warship is defined as "a ship belonging to the armed forces [bear-
ing] the external marks distinguishing [the] ship [as to] its nationality, under the command
of an officer duly commissioned by the government of the state and whose name appears in
the appropriate service list and manned by a crew which is under regular armed forces disci-
pline." Id.
97. B. BRITTIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR SEAGOING OFFICERS 114 (5th ed. 1986) (quoting
A.P. Higgins). Ships that are "owned or operated by a state and used only on governmental
noncommercial service are considered to be in the same category as warships and enjoy the
same immunity." B. BlurriN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR SEAGOING OFFICERS I00 (4th ed. 1981).
98. The cutter is owned absolutely by the United States. The crew of the cutter is
composed entirely of civil service employees paid solely by the United States. A Coast
Guard cutter is under the command of a duly commissioned officer and bears external dis-
tinguishing marks that identify the vessel's nationality.
99. 46 U.S.C. § 2101 (1982).
100. Law of the Sea Treaty, supra note 18, art. 91. However, there must be a genuine
link between the flag ship and the state.
101. Id. art. 19(1). Passage is considered innocent "so long as it is not prejudicial to the
peace, good order or security of the coast State." Id. Any threat or use of force, any exercise
or practice with weapons, and any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of
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coastal state is authorized to seize and arrest the offender.102 In
contrast, if a warship violates the laws of passage of a coastal state,
the coastal state is only permitted to "require the warship to leave
its territorial waters immediately."' 3
The unique character of a warship is most evident when that
vessel is in a foreign port.104 When a warship enters a foreign port
with the permission of the coastal state, the coastal state is grant-
ing impliedly the warship certain immunities from the territorial
jurisdiction of that state."0 " When a merchant vessel enters a port
of a foreign nation, it is required to comply with any laws or regu-
lations of the receiving nation.' If the merchant vessel or its
sailors, while in port, violates any of the coastal state's laws, it is
subject to the jurisdiction of the receiving nation and will be adju-
dicated accordingly. 10
7
Following the same line of reasoning, it makes sense that a
private merchant ship is not considered territory of the United
States. It owes no special allegiance to the state and receives no
special jurisdiction immunities from foreign states. As discussed,
however, public vessels are accorded a much different status. Ac-
cordingly, public vessels cannot be viewed in the same light as
merchant ships when deciding citizenship questions under the
fourteenth amendment. If public vessels are considered to be no
greater than merchant vessels in this aspect, why then are they
treated differently in terms of immunity to foreign jurisdiction?
the defense of the coastal state are deemed prejudicial to the peace. Id. art. 19(2).
102. B. BRsTrsN, supra note 97, at 105-06 (4th ed.).
103. Id. at 106. The warship's sovereign state exercises exclusive jurisdiction over them,
under all circumstances. If a foreign state interferes with that jurisdiction, it is considered
an act of war on their part. Id. at 100.
104. Id. at 106.
105. Id. The immunities arise from customary international law and are not clearly de-
fined. While the warship is in port, police or other port authorities are not "entitled to
board the ship without permission of her commanding officer." Id. at 107. Nor is a com-
manding officer compelled to submit to a search of his ship. Id. When a warship enters a
port it silently agrees to comply with all harbor regulations. If the warship fails to comply
with any regulation, the host country may complain about the violation only through diplo-
matic channels. Id.
Any sovereign state may forbid a foreign warship to enter its ports. However, as a rule,
nations usually grant access of warships to their ports for nations with which they are at
peace. Id. at 106. Permission to enter a foreign port is usually obtained through diplomatic
channels. The United States has entered into several "Naval Visits" agreements with na-
tions whose ports are used most often by U.S. warships. Id.
106. Id. at 118.




Fundamental and overpowering policy concerns were instru-
mental in the final determination of the Cunard case. The Court
had difficulty reconciling United States policy goals to maintain
exclusive control over its territory with the concept of a merchant
ship as a "floating piece" of territory.' The state's ability to sub-
ject a private merchant ship, freely entering and exiting the terri-
tory for purposes of trade, to its laws and jurisdiction, was of the
utmost importance. 09 The Court emphasized the need for a nation
to retain exclusive and absolute jurisdiction over private vessels
that have voluntarily entered its territory." If the Court had de-
cided that United States merchant vessels were territory of the
registering state the United States would have relinquished all
claims of jurisdiction over any actions of foreign merchant ships
within United States territorial waters."'
These policy concerns do not play a part in the situation
where a child is born aboard a public vessel. By declaring a Coast
Guard cutter a part of United States territory, the United States is
not relinquishing any power. There would be no loss of control and
no frustration of policy goals. The vessel is the property of the
United States and would enjoy immunity from foreign jurisdiction
even if found in the coastal waters of another state. Likewise the
policy arguments relied on in Lam Mow and The Matter of A-
also fail to bolster a decision that declares that a public vessel of
the United States is not its territory. Primarily, the courts were
concerned that by declaring a merchant ship to be United States
territory for citizenship purposes would lead to an uncontrollable
influx of new citizens born on United States ships throughout the
world. Obviously, the INS could never monitor or control who was
a citizen in this type of scenario. Conversely, the INS can certainly
oversee births aboard public vessels. First, individuals who are not
United States citizens do not have free access to public ships.1 2
108. Cunard, 262 U.S. at 125.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 124. It is imperative that foreign nationals who are traveling in other coun-
tries, not engaged in the business of a sovereign or national pursuits, be subject to the juris-
diction of the country in which they are found. Id. at 126.
111. A state exercising such a right over their own merchant vessels wherever they may
be in the world, would be inviting other states to exercise equivalent powers.
112. A Turkish citizen would never be able to purchase a ticket to travel on a public




Secondly, the Haitians that were removed from the Dieu Kyvle did
not voluntarily board the Dauntless." 3 They were intercepted in
international waters and forced onto the Coast Guard cutter.11" '
Under these circumstances, there is little danger of a citizenship
explosion that would overwhelm the administrative capabilities of
the INS. The policy concerns that appeared so practical where
merchant ships were involved fail when applied to a situation in-
volving a public vessel.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The INS analyzed the facts surrounding Wislene's birth
aboard the Dauntless in a narrow and routine manner. They were
caught up in the little details and failed to examine the impact of
their decision on a more global scale. This decision will certainly
have few repercussions in terms of children being born on United
States public vessels. The likelihood of this occurring repeatedly is
minimal. However, this decision will continue to have reverbera-
tions long into the future in terms of its precedential value. Declar-
ing that a United States public vessel is not considered United
States territory can only lead to impending disasters in interna-
tional encounters. Will our naval vessels, when in foreign ports be
subject to the jurisdiction of the foreign sovereign? Will foreign
sovereigns be authorized to enter freely our public vessels when-
ever they are encountered in another's coastal waters? These are
considerations that were disregarded in the evaluation of Wislene
Teresias' citizenship status. It is not so much the fact that the INS
has denied citizenship to one child, but more that the INS has
opened the door to diminished control over United States public
vessels while in international waters.
KIM KIEL





Memorandum from Perry A. Rivkind to Jack Penca
Q. Is the child of an alien born on a Coast Guard vessel in
international waters a United States citizen by birth?
A. No. Under the law of the United States such a child is not a
U.S. citizen.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion provides that "all persons born in the United States and sub-
ject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
. . " This provision has been codified in section 301 of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act, Title 8, United States Code, sec.
1401, which states: "The following shall be nationals and citizens
of the United States at birth: (a) a person born in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof; . .. ."
To determine whether the child in this case is a U.S. citizen,
then, the first determination to make is whether the birth occurred
in the United States.
In Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923) the Su-
preme Court held that the phrase "the United States and all terri-
tory subject to the jurisdiction thereof" means: "the regional ar-
eas-of land and adjacent waters-over which the United States
claims and exercises dominion and control as a sovereign
power. . . . [Tihe term is used in a physical and not a metaphori-
cal sense. . . it refers to areas or districts having fixity of location
and recognized boundaries." 262 U.S. at 122. The definition of the
United States in section 101(a)(38) of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act, Title 8, United States Code, sec. 1101(a) is likewise a
geographical definition. The State Department regulations also de-
fine the United States in a geographic sense. 22 C.F.R. sec. 50.1(a).
Since the Coast Guard ship is not a part of the geographic
territory of the United States, one must then consider whether it
can be considered United States territory under any other provi-
sion of law so as to confer citizenship at birth upon the child.
The situation has arisen in the past where a child has been
born on a United States merchant vessel to an alien and a question
raised as to whether the child is a United States citizen. The deter-
mination has always been that the child is not a U.S. citizen. Lam
Mow v. Nagle, 24 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1928); Matter of A, 3 I&N
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Dec. 677 (CO 1949).
Although both cases involved U.S. merchant vessels and a
Coast Guard ship is a public vessel, Title 46, United States Code,
sec. 781; Helgesen v. United States, 275 F. Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y.
1966), the result does not change.
The Department of State's Foreign Affairs Manual, 7 F.A.M.
1113.1-4(a) states: "A U.S. registered ship on the high seas is not
considered to be part of the United States. Therefore, a child born
on such a vessel outside U.S. territorial waters does not acquire
U.S. citizenship by reason of place of birth." The Department of
State's legal counsel informs me that this provision is applicable to
both public vessels and merchant vessels. Counsel for both the
Navy Department and the Coast Guard also stated that their agen-
cies' positions are in accord with that of the Department of State
and they do not consider their vessels to be floating pieces of
United States territory.
Based upon the authority I have uncovered I conclude that
the child born on the Coast Guard ship is not a U.S. citizen since
the child was not born in the United States as required by the
Fourteenth Amendment for acquisition of citizenship at birth.
1989]
